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OHIO'S "SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE":
ITS USES AND ABUSES
DAVID L. HERBERT*
AND
DICK W. MOUNT, JR. t
PREFACES INCE 1969, seven Ohio Supreme Court cases' have directly analyzed Ohio's
"Similar Acts Statute."2 The statute has been a source of major confusion
to attorneys and judges alike-even the title itself being subject to some
inherent misunderstanding.' The judicial analysis of the Act was necessitated
for the most part, by two primary factors: (1) prosecutorial misuse of the
statute;' and, (2) trial court misinterpretation of the breadth, scope and
applicability of the statute in particular cases.'
This confusion has not been resolved despite the fact that the Ohio
Supreme Court has most recently interpreted the Act once again in State v.
Curry.' Furthermore, no comprehensive analysis has been offered in the legal
literature which could conceivably resolve the matter. The authors of this
article itself were unable to agree upon the "correct" interpretation of the
Act-perhaps due to the adversarial legal positions which each occupies.
Notwithstanding the lack of uniform analysis of the Act, this article
should isolate the main areas of confusion and hopefully provide some "food
for thought" which may in itself help to resolve the ambiguities of the statute.
Moreover, the discussion offered herein may prompt the recently established
Ohio Evidence Rules Committee to devote some time to the formulation of
a clearer evidentiary statement on prosecutorial use of "other acts" testimony
in criminal cases.
* Assistant Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Canton, Ohio; J.D., University of Akron,
School of Law; B.B.A., Kent State University.
t Staff Attorney, Stark County Public Defender's Office, Canton, Ohio; J.D., University of
Akron, School of Law; B.B.A., Kent State University.
1 State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d
157, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974); State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St. 2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972);
State v. Carver, 30 Ohio St. 2d 280, 285 N.E.2d 26 (1972); State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St. 2d
79, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971); State v. Moorehead, 24 Ohio St. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 551 (1970);
State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
2 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
3 State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St. 2d 124, 126, 285 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1972):
Much confusion about R.C. § 2945.59 might be avoided if it were observed that
nowhere therein do the words "like" or "similar" appear. The statute permits the showing
of "other acts" when such other acts "tend to show" certain things. If such other acts do
in fact "tend to show" any of those things they are admissible notwithstanding they may
not be "like" or "similar" to the crime charged.
'See, e.g., State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 167, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).
5 See, e.g., State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
6 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
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OHIO'S "SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE":
A PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
DAVID L. HERBERT
I. INTRODUCTION
p ROSECUTORIAL TRIAL USE of Ohio's "similar acts" statute1 has been
somewhat limited in recent years because of seemingly contradictory court
interpretations as to the proper application of the statute in particular cases.'
As a result of these apparent contradictions, trial courts have been hesitant,
perhaps understandably so, to allow the state the opportunity to introduce
"other acts testimony"' in criminal cases except where the use of such
testimony has been indirectly approved by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Ohio's similar acts statute, as discussed elsewhere," has its origins in the
common law of Ohio,5 the United States6 and England.7 Legal historians
have determined that in the beginning, the law made no provisions for the use
of other acts evidence in criminal cases,' the theory being that the accused
should not have to answer for acts other than those charged in the indictment
for which he was on trial.' The rule through the decades, however, evolved
to the point where certain testimony or evidence of prior criminal acts was
I Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
2 Compare State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975) with State v. Hector, 19
Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
3 "Other acts testimony" may be defined as evidence of another act or acts, which a criminal
defendant performed prior to, contemporaneous with or subsequent to the criminal act for
which he must stand trial, where such other acts testimony is material to a matter in issue.
4 See Note, 5 O.S.L.J. 232, 233 (1939), where the author comments that: "It has frequently
been held that the statute is simply a reiteration of the common law, and so its constitutionality
is beyond question."
5 See Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928); Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio
St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922); Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 233 (1917); State
v. Reineke, 89 Ohio St. 390, 106 N.E. 52 (1914); Boyd v. State, 81 Ohio St. 239, 90 N.E. 355
(1909); Jackson v. State, 38 Ohio St. 585 (1883); Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio St. 581 (1883);
Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507 (1882); Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 (1876); Brown v.
State, 26 Ohio St. 176 (1875); Shriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 130 (1872); Reed v. State, 15
Ohio 217 (1846); Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5 (1831); Ohio v. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 407
(C.P. 1851).
6 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988
(1938) [hereinafter cited as Stone, America].
7 See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARv. L. REv. 954
(1933) [hereinafter cited as Stone, England].
8 Stone, America, supra note 6, at 989.
9 See, e.g., Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 289-90, 164 N.E. 51, 52 (1928). See also
I JONES ON EVmENCE § 162, at 290-91 (5th ed. 1958).
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allowed to be used for limited purposes to prove such things as intent, motive,
absence of mistake or accident, or identity.'0
The common law of the United States, relying heavily in the beginning
upon the common law of England, began in the 1800's to chip away at the
original English Rule which excluded all other acts evidence in criminal
cases."1 Various state courts, including those in Ohio, began to vary their
evidentiary rules to allow limited prosecutorial use of other acts testimony in
criminal cases.1 One of the first Ohio cases apparently dealing with other acts
evidence arose in 1831.11 In this early Ohio prosecution, the Supreme Court
of Ohio approved the use of other acts testimony to establish "the guilty
knowledge of the defendant... ."" The court in analyzing the prosecution's
use of such evidence stated:
It can hardly be deemed necessary at this day to go into any course of
reasoning to prove that circumstantial or presumptive evidence is allowed
to prevail, even to the convicting of an offender... [because such
evidence] is, in its own nature, capable of producing the highest degree
of moral certainty.1"
By 1928, the use of other acts testimony in criminal cases for limited
evidentiary purposes gained a strong foothold in Ohio.1" The common law
basis of the original rule and its exceptions was explained by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Whiteman v. State"7 in rather lengthy fashion:
The real meaning of this rule is that evidence of collateral offenses must
never be received as substantive evidence of the offense on trial. While
the rule itself is fundamental and well settled by a long line of adjudica-
10 See, e.g., Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 289-90, 164 N.E. 51, 52 (1928). See also
McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 447-54 (2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as MCCORMICK]; Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REv.
325(1956) [hereinafter cited as Slough & Knightly].
When the terms "limited purpose" or "limited evidentiary purpose" are used herein, these
terms mean that other acts evidence offered under Ohio's similar acts statute, is evidence
received to prove one of those items mentioned in the statute either directly or inferentially. In
this sense, therefore, other acts evidence is evidence used for the purpose of proving a limited
evidentiary matter such as intent or identity. It should be considered by the jury in their fact
finding function, to determine whether or not the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of the crime charged. This is a somewhat different definition than that offered in
State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St. 2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972); but, both definitions are in
substantial accord as to the point that other acts testimony, received for one of the purposes
mentioned in the statute can be used by the jury to determine if the state has proved each
element of the crime charged.
11 See Stone, America, supra note 6, at 989-93.
12 See, e.g., Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5 (1831).
13Id.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 10-11.
18 See Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 291-93, 164 N.E. 51, 53 (1928).
17 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
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tion, it is equally fundamental and well settled that in certain classes of
cases collateral offenses may be shown as reflecting upon the mental
processes or mental attitude of the accused, where intent or guilty
knowledge is an essential element of the crime for which the defendant is
on trial, or as throwing light upon the motive inducing the commission of
the crime, or to prove identity of the defendant, where identity is an
issue, and more especially where such collateral offenses have been
executed according to a plan or method, and it is shown that the accused
persons committed such other offenses, and in so doing followed the same
plan or method as is shown to have been followed in the commission
of the crime charged in the indictment."8
This restatement of the Ohio common law rule was codified in 1929.19
This enactment, while being in conflict with the original English Rule, was
in almost exact conformity with the common law existing in the State of
Ohio,"0 the United States"1 and England"2 at the time of its passage, contrary
to what some jurists later believed.23 The 1929 enactment was amended in
19534 but remains to this date in substantially the common law form as
expressed by the Whiteman court.
Through the years, Ohio's similar acts statute has been construed and
reconstrued in a rather inconsistent fashion.25 These contradictions appear to
arise at least partially from a misinterpretation of the enactment's common
law origins. For example, in 1963 the court of appeals for Stark County in
the case of State v. Strong2" stated: "[The similar acts statute] being in
derogation of the common law rule of exclusion which did not permit other
acts to be shown at all, must be construed strictly against the state."
2 7
As has been demonstrated however, the common law rule existing in
Ohio in 1929 when the first act was promulgated did permit proof of other
acts for limited evidentiary purposes. 8 This being the case, any interpretation
of the statute should make reference to the common law for interpretative
insight because "all legislation must be interpreted in the light of the common
18 Id. at 290, 164 N.E. at 52.
19 Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 23, § 13444-19 [1929] Ohio Laws 190 (repealed 1953).
20 See Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
21 See Stone, America, supra note 6.
22 See Stone, England, supra note 7.
2
3 See State v. Strong, 119 Ohio App. 31, 196 N.E.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1963).
2
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
25 Compare State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975) with State v. Hector, 19
Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
26 119 Ohio App. 31, 196 N.E.2d 801 (1963).
27 Id. at 36, 196 N.E.2d at 805.
28 See Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 31 (1928).
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law and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the time of its enactment."2
This ancient rule of statutory construction has, for the most part, been
forgotten by Ohio courts interpreting the similar acts statute. If the courts
had analyzed the enactment in light of its common law basis, some of the
contradictions might have been avoided.
Inasmuch as the common law does provide a logical system of doctrines,
principles, rules and practices which furnish one of the most reliable
backgrounds upon which any statute can be studied,"0 this analysis of Ohio's
similar acts statute will systematically refer to the law's origins for "valuable
clues"" as to the proper interpretation of the enactment. What follows then
is an attempt to analyze the statute in light of its common law origins with
the hope that this may lead to a better understanding of the breadth, scope
and applicability of the statute in particular cases.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND MISCONSTRUCTION
OF OHIO'S SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE
Ohio's similar acts statute applies only to criminal cases where certain
acts of the defendant are sought to be proved for some limited evidentiary
purpose.3" The statute has no application to non-criminal cases or to acts
of someone other than the defendant." Furthermore, the statute cannot be
used solely to prove a defendant's criminal disposition 3' or to attack his
credibility," although some other evidentiary rule may allow such use.
The statute may be used however, to enable the prosecution to inferentially
prove certain limited evidentiary facts." Thus, where a criminal defendant has
committed some prior, contemporaneous or subsequent act,' which by
inference, tends to prove a material fact in issue, the state may prove such facts
to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, or the defendant's
scheme, plan or system in doing an act'3 (which itself may be used to establish
29 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at 268 (4th ed. 1973)
(emphasis added).
30 Id.
31Id.
32 See, e.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
33 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
34 See, e.g., State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).
35 See Comment, Evidence of Criminal History in Ohio Criminal Prosecutions, 15 WEST. RES.
L. REv. 772 (1964).
36 See note 10, supra.
37 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
38 See State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 159, 311 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1974).
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identity"9 ). The proof of such matters is obviously for the limited purposes
mentioned in the act and cannot properly be used for any other purpose."9
At common law, other acts testimony could similarly be used for limited
evidentiary purposes-not to prove criminal disposition but to prove intent,"
motive,"2 absence of mistake or accident,"3 or identity." Such evidence, then as
today, was deemed to be circumstantial proof of a particular element of the
crime charged," or of a material fact or corroborative evidence of one or
the other. 6 This form of testimony was admissible at common law where it
was deemed competent and relevant to prove a matter in controversy. 7
Under Ohio's present similar acts statute, prosecutorial use of other acts
of the defendant for limited evidentiary purposes may be made where such
acts are material in proving an element of the crime charged that is in issue."
Although most Ohio courts have tended to use the words relevant and material
almost interchangeably,"0 they have separate and distinct meaning.
Relevancy, as defined by one of the most respected authorities on
evidence is: "[T]he tendency of evidence to establish a material proposition.""0
Materiality, on the other hand, is the tendency of evidence to prove an
ultimate matter in issue." A matter is in issue when it must be proved by the
initiator of the litigation in order for him to prevail.5 Relevant evidence then,
is evidence that has some probative value in proving a material proposition or
39 State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d
167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). Some courts, e.g., State v. Brown, 137 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955) have taken the position that proof of identity is outside the scope of the statute, but
inasmuch as the statute is merely declaratory of its common law existing at the time of the
statutes initial enactment, identity should be construed to be within the law's framework.
See generally, Comment, Evidence of Criminal History in Ohio Criminal Prosecutions, 15
WEST. REs. L. REv. 772, 777 (1964).
40 See, e.g., State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 174-78, 249 N.E.2d 912, 916-18 (1969).
41 Cf. Shriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 130 (1872).
4 2 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176 (1875).
43 Cf., e.g., Ohio v. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 407 (C.P. 1851).
44 See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922).
45 See, e.g., Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
46 See Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922).
47 See Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
48 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
49 See, e.g., State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
50 McCoRMicK, supra note 10, § 185, at 435.
51 Id. § 185, at 434.
52 Id. See also State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
[Vol. 9:2
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fact. Material evidence consequently, is evidence that goes to establish the
ultimate issues, those matters which must be proved to prevail. Evidence that
is or is not material depends upon the particular pleadings or charge of the
case in question. For example, if a criminal defendant admits the crime
charged but attempts to negate liability therefore by putting forth a defense of
entrapment, he would in effect, be admitting the elements of the crime;"
consequently, evidence offered to prove the elements of the crime in question
would be immaterial since these matters would not be in issue.
With this background in mind, it is important to note that other acts
testimony or evidence, aside from other matters, could be used in every case
where such evidence is of value in establishing ultimate issues in controversy,5'
i.e., those issues which the charge requires to be proved." Thus, for example,
where a defendant is charged with murder, other acts of his which go to
establishing an ultimate issue or element of the crime, could be used to estab-
lish, e.g., intent, assuming the other evidentiary requirements could be met."
In every criminal case then, the prosecution should be free to use other
acts testimony to establish one or more of the elements of the crime charged
when such elements are in issue. When one or more of the elements have been
admitted by the defense, proof of other acts to establish one of these elements
would be immaterial and consequently inadmissible under the statute."
When the similar acts statute is used to allow prosecutorial presentation
of other acts testimony or evidence to prove motive or intent, the state seeks to
establish one of two differently defined terms, one an element of some crimes
and the other merely inferential proof of the commission of a crime by a named
defendant. Motive, as distinguished from intent, may be defined as the mental
inducement which prompts the criminal act;3s intent, on the other hand, may
be defined as purpose. 9 To summarize then, "Intent spells purpose to use a
53 See PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 1031 (2d ed. 1969). Such an admission, in order to raise the
defense of entrapment cannot be required however, People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d
934 (1965). Once a defense of entrapment is put forth, evidence of prior convictions of the
same type of offense would be admissible to counter the claim, United States v. Sherman, 240
F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957).
54 See State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
5 See Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio St. 581, 584 (1883). See also State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66,
330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); Comment, Evidence of Criminal History in Ohio Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 15 WEST. RES. L. REv. 772, 776 (1964).
56 See, e.g., Ohio v. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 407 (Com. P. 1851).
57 See Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio St. 581, 584 (1883). Cf. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66,
330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
5 See Shelton v. State, 106 Ohio St. 243, 140 N.E. 153 (1922); Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St.
176, 181-82 (1875).
59 See Slough & Knightly, supra note 10, at 328.
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particular means to obtain a desired end, whereas motive supplies the reason
that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent."6
A different admissibility test applies to proof of either motive or intent by
the use of other acts testimony than would be the case where other acts were
used to show, inter alia, identity." When the prosecution attempts to establish
either motive or intent by proof of similar acts, the evidence offered must show
"acts so related to the offense for which the defendant is on trial that they have
a logical connection therewith ... ." It must be "clearly shown that a
connection in the mind of the defendant must have existed between the
offense charged in the indictment and others of a similar nature."63 Where
such mental connection is shown, evidence of such related other acts is
admissible to show either motive or intent."4
Under this "logical connection test," as some have labeled it,65 the other
acts evidence used must not be too remote in time or place and must be
closely related factually to the crime for which the defendant stands trial.6
Where the prosecution seeks to use other acts testimony to establish intent as
opposed to motive, the crime charged must include the element of intent
which must be in issue.67
When the statute is used to allow prosecutorial presentation of similar
acts testimony to show absence of mistake or accident on the defendant's
part, the statute seems to contemplate the use of other acts only after the
defendant has claimed accident or mistake." Therefore, to be admissible
such other acts would have to be factually quite similar to have any probative
value in negating the accident or mistake claim.69
This admissibility requirement appears to be the only one necessary.
o ld.
61 See State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).
62 State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 229, 78 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1948).
63 Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176, 181 (1875) (emphasis added).
64Id. at 181-82. Cf. Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507, 514 (1882). See generally State v.
Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948).
65 State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 229, 78 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1948), in which the court held:
"To be admissible, testimony offered under the statute must show acts so related to the offense
for which a defendant is on trial that they have a logical connection therewith and may
reasonably disclose a motive or purpose for the commission of such offense."
66 See State v. Carver, 30 Ohio St. 2d 280, 285 N.E.2d 26 (1972).
67 State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
68 Cf. United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963);
People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P.2d 917 (1936). See also State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d
66, 72, 330 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1975).
69 See, e.g., State v. Lapaze, 57 N.H. 245, 294 (1876).
[Vol. 9:2
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However, some Ohio courts, and at least one writer,"0 seem to have taken: the
position that in order for other acts testimony to be admissible to negate a
claim of accident or mistake, the prosecution must show "that a connection, in
the mind of the defendant must have existed between the offense in question
and the other acts of a similar nature." 7 1 This statement of the supreme court
in State v. Burson"2 was attributed to an earlier Ohio case, State v. Moore."
Ostensibly, this application of the "logical connection test" to absence of
mistake or accident cases would require a proximity of time and place, as that
test does in intent or motive cases. This would be sheer folly considering the
wide range of possible cases covering a perhaps long period of time.
The above quoted statement of the Burson court cannot be attributed to
the Moore decision inasmuch as Moore addressed a different question,
i.e., the standards for admissibility for other acts testimony in cases where the
prosecution attempted to negate a claim of accident or mistake. This gross
misinterpretation of the Moore opinion has led to substantial but needless
confusion. Neither precedent nor logic dictate a different admissibility test than
that offered herein where absence of mistake or accident issues are material.
In cases where the statute is used to prove the defendant's scheme, plan
or system in doing an act, the reasons for allowing such evidence are different
than when other uses of the statute are made. Proof of a defendant's scheme,
plan or system may have one of two main uses under the law: to prove the
existence of a conspiracy," or to prove identity. 5 In order to use the statute
to prove such limited evidentiary matters however, the existence of a
conspiracy or the identity of the defendant must be in issue. 6
Some Ohio courts have taken the position that that portion of the similar
acts statute relating to scheme, plan or system has relevance where the
other acts testimony is part of the res gestae of the crime for which
the defendant is on trial.7 However, the statute has really no application in
such situations because the facts are usually so interwoven as to be
70 See Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute": A nother Interpretation, infra.
71 State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 157, 160, 311 N.E.2d 526, 628-29 (1974).
72 Id.
78 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948).
74 Cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 190 at 448-49. See also Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90,
117 N.E. 223 (1917); Jackson v. State, 38 Ohio St. 585 (1883); Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio St.
581 (1883).
15 See, e.g., State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); MCCORMICK, supra note
10, § 190 at 451. But see State v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St. 2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972);
Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 330.
76 See State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
77 Id.
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inseparable."8 In such cases, therefore, other acts testimony is allowed simply
because there is no way to separate such facts from the alleged criminal act."0
Consequently, the other acts testimony is not for a limited evidentiary purpose,
but should be received without limitation as any other direct evidence.8"
The admissibility requirements for the use of other acts testimony in cases
where identity is sought to be shown, were most recently examined by the
supreme court in State v. Curry."' In this case the defendant was charged with
the crime of statutory rape. The prosecution introduced the testimony of the
victim of this crime, the testimony of a witness to part of the facts thereof, and
the testimony of a victim of another similar offense involving the defendant.
As to the use of other acts testimony to establish identity, the supreme court
held that the other acts evidence had been improperly admitted because the
defendant acknowledged that he had been with the victim on the date in
question and that therefore "identity was not a material issue." 2 Consequently,
the prosecution's attempt to prove the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime by the use of other acts testimony earmarking
the scheme, plan or system as that of the defendant was held to be error.8"
The gravaman of the court's opinion rests upon the statement that
"identity was not a material issue." However, the word identity as the court
partially recognized, is not some abstract term. Identity in a criminal case is
in issue and material when the state must prove that the defendant is the
perpetrator of the crime.84 The mere fact that a defendant admits that he was
with the victim of the crime or that he was in the area of the occurrence does
not relieve the prosecution of its burden to establish the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, in the Curry case, identity was a material
issue because the prosecution was not relieved of its burden of establishing
the identity of the perpetrator by the mere non-culpatory admissions of the
defendant. While the identity element of any crime is material to the case,
unless admitted, the probative value of other acts testimony to prove identity
78 See Slough & Knightly, supra note 10, at 332:
Paging through the reports one frequently finds the principle of this exception to the rule
of exclusion explained in terms of res gestae, thus it is common for courts to state that
evidence of other crimes is admissible as part of the res gestae. Perhaps the exoticism of
the Latin tongue appeals to the Anglo-Saxon mind; but aside from the fact that use of a
foreign expression may serve as a convenient cliche or memory aid, there is little reason
for resort to pseudo-intellectualism to demonstrate an idea which can be explained in
simple English. In this instance, evidence of other crimes is receivable as a necessary and
inseparable part of the transaction in issue.
t 9 See 1 WIGMoRW, EVIDENCE § 218, at 464-66 (2d ed. 1923).
80 See note 78 supra.
81 43 Ohio St. 2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975).
82 Id. at 73, 330 N.E.2d at 726.
83 Id.
a' Cf. PERKrNs ON CRIMINAL LAW 645 (2d ed. 1969).
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may decrease with the availability of other direct evidence.85 However, in such
a prosecution as statutory rape, where the victim is often a young child, such
other acts testimony often has great probative value in establishing identity
and in corroborating the victim's recount of the facts."
If the Curry rationale was carried to its extremes, everytime a victim or a
witness identifies a defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, other
acts testimony designed to prove identity by comparison of the scheme, plan
or system of the other act with the criminal act in question, would be deemed
to be immaterial. This result is not supported by earlier Ohio cases or by the
definition of materiality offered earlier.8
In an earlier Ohio prosecution, State v. Hector," the supreme court stated:
The legal determination, by comparison of the plan, system or method
employed in a prior crime with the plan, system or method employed in
the crime in question, of whether the former is relevant to the issue of
identity of the perpetrator of the latter, must be made without considera-
tion of the fact that eye witnesses have identified the same person as
the perpetrator of both crimes. (emphasis added)
There must be some similarity of methodology employed which itself
would constitute probative evidence of the probability that the same
person (whoever he might be) committed both crimes. In such event,
eye-witness proof of the identity of the perpetrator of the prior offense is
relevant proof on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the offense
in question. Absent such proof, it has no relevancy, and such omission is
not supplied by the fact that eye witnesses at the scene of the offense
in question identified the same person as the perpetrator of that offense.
For such evidence to be admissible, there must be such a logical
connection between the crimes that proof of the one will naturally tend
to show that the accused is the person who committed the other."9
If these admission prerequisites as laid down in Hector, are met and if
the defendant has not admitted that he is the perpetrator of the crime, identity
is material and should be admitted. The Hector case, as the above quote
presupposes, involved two separate identifications: one by the victim of the
crime for which the defendant was then standing trial, and one by the victim
85 See FED. R. Evm. 400(b), Advisory Committee Notes. Compare People v. Buskievich, 330
Ill. 532, 162 N.E. 196 (1928) with Kirby v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535, 267 S.W. 1094
(Ct. App. 1925).
8 6 See Boyd v. State, 81 Ohio St. 239, 90 N.E. 355 (1909).
87 See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
8 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
89 Id. at 177, 249 N.E.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
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of a "similar act," such act being used to earmark the criminal acts as the
handiwork of the defendant, thereby identifying him as the perpetrator of
the criminal act in question.
Cases arising prior and subsequent to Hector further support this theory.
For example, in an early Ohio prosecution, Boyd v. State,9" the state was
allowed to introduce other acts testimony in a statutory rape case to show two
things: (1) the relations between the parties; and (2) to provide corroborative
evidence of the testimony of the prosecutrix, including her identification of the
defendant.91 A similar result was reached in another early prosecution,
Whiteman v. State.9" In a later Ohio prosecution, State v. Carter,93 the
supreme court approved the use of similar acts testimony in an armed robbery
case to help establish identity, even though two victims of the crime for
which the defendant was on trial made positive identifications."4 A comparable
result was reached in Barnett v. State95 arising in 1922.
As has been demonstrated, judicial construction or misconstruction, as
the case may be, of Ohio's similar acts statute has been somewhat confusing to
say the least. The exceptions to the very early common law rule originating
in England, are perhaps now broader than the "rule" itself.96 It may well be as
Dean Wigmore suggested in 1940, that the precedents cannot be reconciled
with any degree of certainty or with any expectation of reward.97 However,
the sometimes important and significant role which the statute can play,
demand that some analysis be made of the "proper" uses of the law.
III. A RECONCILIATION-SOME THOUGHTS ON A RECONSTRUCTION
OF OHIO'S SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE
Aside from some of the confusing court interpretations of the statute
already discussed, some cases do supply valuable insights as to the proper uses
of the statute. First, and without much question, the statute should only be
used where the prosecution seeks to prove a material fact in issue.9" Any other
use would violate the wording of the statute by merely showing the criminal
disposition of the defendant.9 Secondly, the statute should only be used to
90 81 Ohio St. 239, 90 N.E. 355 (1909).
91 Id.
92 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
93 26 Ohio St. 2d 79, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971).
4 Id.
91 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922).
99 Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Gratt. 862, 870 (Va. 1878).
97 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 302 (3d ed. 1940).
9 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.59 (Page 1953).
99 See State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).
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prove those limited things provided for in the statute, i.e., motive, intent,
absence of mistake or accident, or the plan, system or scheme used in doing
an act. Moreover, when the statute is used to prove absence of mistake or
accident, such usage should only be allowed where a claim of mistake
or accident is presented. Thirdly, it should be remembered that the portion of
the statute allowing proof of plan, system or scheme, may be used to establish
two ultimate facts: conspiracy or identity. Where the prosecution introduces
similar acts testimony as to these two items such evidence is for a limited
purpose; but, where the prosecution introduces other acts testimony as to acts
so related to the crime charged as to be inseparable from it, that evidence is not
limited purpose evidence but direct testimony about the crime charged.1"'
When the statute is used to prove motive or intent, the logical connection
test as laid down in State v. Moore... should serve as the standard for
admission. However, when the statute is used to prove absence of mistake or
accident, the use of a logical connection admissibility test appears to be
misplaced. The only requirement for admission should be similarity of method-
ology employed as was partially discussed in Moore."2 When the statute permits
proof of prior "similar acts" to establish identity, such proof should be admit-
ted based upon the test as laid down in Hector... and applied in Burson:...
The legal determination, by comparison of the plan, system, or method
employed in a prior crime with the plan, system or method employed
in the crime in question, of whether the former is relevant to the
issue of identity of the perpetrator of the latter, must be made without
consideration of the fact that eyewitnesses have identified the same
person as the perpetrator of both crimes.
There must be some similarity of methodology employed which itself
would constitute probative evidence of the probability that the same
person (whoever he might be) committed both crimes. In such event
eye-witness proof of the identity of the perpetrator of the prior offense is
relevant proof on the issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the
offense in question. 0 '
Moreover, there is no valid reason to exclude the presentation of
evidence to prove identity in a case where there is some evidence of such,
unless the probative value of such other acts testimony, when compared to
100 See note 78 supra.
101 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948).
102 Id.
103 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969).
104 38 Ohio St. 2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526 (1974).
105 State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 177, 249 N.E.2d 912, 918 (1969).
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other evidence is almost nil. Furthermore, in a case where the defendant
admits being with the victim of the crime or in the area of the occurrence,
other acts evidence offered to prove identity should be admitted. When we
consider that the prosecution must establish that the defendant is the
perpetrator of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is fairly easy to
understand that a contrary rule, as hinted to in Curry, is not justified in logic
or on the basis of past precedent.
IV. A LIGHT OF HOPE: OHIO'S EVIDENCE RULES COMMITTEE-SOME
THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF OTHER ACTS TESTIMONY IN OHIO
Inasmuch as Ohio is presently considering a revision of its common law
and statutory rules of evidence,"0 6 some thought should be given to the future
of similar acts testimony in Ohio. An examination of other codified rules of
evidence may be of some benefit to this discussion. The recently adopted
Federal Rules of Evidence,' permit the use of other acts testimony or
evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake or accident. 10 The accompanying Committee
Notes to the Federal Rules indicate:
The determination must be made [under the Rules] whether the danger
of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in
view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts
appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.1"'
Similarly, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, "' permit the use of other
acts testimony to prove limited material facts,"' if the probative value of such
evidence is not outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the defendant."'
Both the Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules place significant emphasis
on the possible prejudice which other acts evidence may play in criminal cases.
The possibility of such prejudice cannot be discounted. However, the relevancy
of such evidence in proper cases cannot be forgotten. Consequently, any new
Ohio rule should seek to balance these two possibly conflicting philosophies.
Because of conflicting case interpretations, some thought should be given
106 The Ohio Evidence Rules Committee was established in 1975 by the Supreme Court of Ohio
to consider a codification of the rules of evidence existing in Ohio.
107 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law on January 2, 1975, to take effect
180 days from the date of enactment. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926.
108 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
'
09 FED. R. EviD. 404(b) Advisory Committee Notes.
110 The Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and approved at its annual conference in 1953.
"'l UNIFORM R. EvD. 55.
1 2 UNIFORM R. Evw. 45.
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to including within such a rule, admissibility standards for the introduction of
different kinds of other acts evidence. In this manner, past misinterpretations
of such standards could ostensibly be avoided. Explicit guidelines should be
promulgated which could serve as definitive standards for trial judges to
follow when they attempt to determine whether or not to admit other acts
testimony. Perhaps the standards in Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
could serve as a viable starting point for such a purpose. 1 '
In any case, because of the confusing interpretations of other acts cases
in Ohio, some careful planning should go into any revision of Ohio's similar
acts statute. Anything less may further complicate the admissibility standards
for other acts testimony in this state.
113 UNIFORM R. EvID. 45:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the jury, or (c)
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
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